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Book Note
LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS 
DO, by David Howarth 1
DANIELLE CORNACCHIA
WOULD IT BE ACCURATE, OR CONSTRUCTIVE, to describe what lawyers do as 
engineering? David Howarth’s response is a fervent “yes” in Law as Engineering. 
Th e author sketches the ethical implications for legal professionals of thinking and 
acting like professional engineers. Howarth argues that, whereas engineers take 
seriously the societal consequences of their work, lawyers incompletely theorize 
the potential consequences of their “devices” (e.g., contracts, wills, corporations) 
and that this tendency needs to change. Th e shortsighted lawyers should adopt 
the engineers’ broad-minded professional touch.
Howarth weaves together seminal issues and case studies in both legal and 
engineering ethics to arrive at preliminary best practices for lawyers wishing to 
avoid contributing to such large-scale disasters as the collapse of the world’s 
fi nancial markets (e.g., the Great Crash of 2008). Th e book’s six chapters are 
introduced in chapter one, which includes a thorough literature review of 
relevant scholarship.2 Th e defi nition of what lawyers do is fl eshed out in chapter 
two, where the author focuses on transactional work. Although the book concerns 
only two professional contexts—England and the United States—it could easily be 
of interest to lawyers working in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
Howarth introduces chapter three (Law as Engineering) by defi ning what 
engineers do and how they go about doing it. Unlike lawyers, engineers describe 
their design processes in terms of systems; this enables them to specify and to 
test design outcomes at various system levels. With this defi nition in mind, 
the author introduces the concept of law-as-engineering, observing that, like 
1. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) 237 pages.
2. See e.g. Roscoe Pound, Social Control Th rough Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1942), cited in ibid at 6, n 13.
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engineers, “lawyers want to make something useful that works for their clients.”3 
But, he acknowledges, “[t]he uncertainties involved for transactions lawyers 
in assessing risks at system levels beyond the law are considerable.”4 Chapters 
four and fi ve take the law-as-engineering analogy further, exploring its ethical 
implications for transactional lawyers, litigators, judges, and legal academics. 
In chapter four, Howarth walks the reader through lawyers’ roles in the Great 
Crash using two case studies—the fall of Lehman Brothers and the controversial 
activities of Goldman Sachs. He is not convinced, for example, that the lawyers 
at the London offi  ce of Linklaters, an English law fi rm, who helped justify 
Lehman Brothers’s infamous Repo 105 transactions should see themselves as one or 
more system-levels removed from an ethical responsibility to prevent such specious 
dealings. To be clear, Howarth does not allege that the lawyers engaged in fraudulent 
undertakings. Instead, he uses these examples as a basis for speculating on the 
limits of lawyers’ professional obligations. He asks, for example, “Do lawyers 
have an obligation to preserve the stability of markets… ?”5 And, although he 
never quite answers that or many questions like it, Howarth does make a case 
for minimizing specialization-based scapegoating (e.g., blaming the accountants, 
not the lawyers). Th e kernel of Howarth’s response is informed by two arguments 
from engineering ethics against technological neutrality, which he extrapolates to 
legal technology (e.g., Repos).
Chapter fi ve is where Howarth outlines the implications of law-as-engineering 
for legal research and teaching. In chapter six, the reader is asked, once more, to 
consider the issue that unifi es chapters one through four—why lawyers should be 
described as engineers. Howarth reiterates that this description “is useful because 
it provides a sound starting point for appraising what lawyers do, through the 
application of engineering ethics to their activities, and for improving their 
performance, through searching for principles of eff ective design.”6 He dedicates 
the remainder of his concluding chapter to responding to four objections to 
this position. 
Th e resulting ethical framework appears to be a unique blend of instrumentalism 
and consequentialism, although Howarth never describes it as such. Whether or not 
readers will agree with the author’s theoretical product, they will surely admire his 
ability to tackle provocative and timely questions in a well-mannered tone. Written 
3. Ibid at 67.
4. Ibid at 82.
5. Ibid at 108.
6. Ibid at 189.
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in accessible prose, Law as Engineering should appeal to a general audience of legal 
scholars, practitioners, and law students seeking a renewed engagement with 
foundational questions of legal practice.
